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Two Nondescriptivist Views of 
Normative and Evaluative 
Statements 
Matthew Chrisman (Edinburgh) 
1. Introduction 
 
Some metaethicists are impressed by the idea that normative statements (e.g. 
saying what someone ought to do) differ fundamentally from statements 
describing reality. This idea has founded a fecund research program in 20th 
century metaethics including the development of emotivist, prescriptivist, 
projectivist, and (most recently) expressivist views. The sorts of expressivism 
currently on the market are highly sophisticated, inspiring great ingenuity even 
amongst their critics in thinking about the function of normative/evaluative 
language and the relations between this and normative/evaluative thought.1 In my 
view, however, there is a different and better way to get to the idea that normative 
statements do not describe reality.  
This alternative is based on the dominant view in deontic logic and formal 
semantics that ought-statements should be treated as expressing a type of modal 
judgment.2 More specifically, in this literature, ought-statements are commonly 
regarded as “weak” necessity claims, where context determines the flavor (moral, 
prudential, teleological, epistemic) of weak necessity. A different and older 
tradition in the philosophy of mind and language was impressed by the idea that 
there is a fundamental difference between representing empirical facts and 
making modal judgments concerning various ways in which things might 
necessarily or possibly be. For example, considering the content of judgments 
about the world as it can be represented in our experiences, Kant wrote, “The 
modality of judgments is a quite special function of them, which is distinctive in 
that it contributes nothing to the content of the judgment” (1787/1998: 209). And 
considering the propositional content of judgments conceived of as 
representations of reality, Frege wrote, “By saying that a proposition is necessary 
I give a hint about the grounds for my judgment. But, since this does not affect 
                                                        
1 See Sinclair 2009 and Chrisman 2011 for discussion of the history and some relatively recent 
developments. 
2 Portner (2009: chs. 2-3) contains a great introductory discussion; see also Chrisman 2015 for an 
introduction.  
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the content of the judgment, the form of the apodictic judgment has no 
significance for us” (1879/1967: 13).  
Developing this tradition’s insight about modality suggests treating ought-
statements as nondescriptive because they are modal (rather than because they 
are emotive, prescriptive, projective, or expressive). This is the kind of view of 
‘ought’ I favor as a foundation for a nondescriptivist view about normative 
thought and discourse.3 Because of its contrasting explanation of why normative 
language is nondescriptive, I have been reluctant in my own work in metaethics 
to adopt the label “expressivist” despite agreeing with many expressivist 
arguments against descriptivist views in metaethics. Kant and Frege didn’t think 
modal statements express anything like prescriptions, noncognitive attitudes, or 
planning states, but they do seem to have regarded them as nondescriptive  
because they performed some function in our thought and talk different from 
describing reality. To draw out this contrast with the expressivist tradition in 
more detail, there are two questions I want to explore here. 
First (and mainly), even if we agree with Kant that the modality of a judgment 
contributes nothing to the content of that judgment, or we agree with Frege that 
saying a proposition is necessary does not affect the content of the judgment that 
it is true, it is obvious that we should not say that ‘ought’ contributes nothing to 
the meaning of statements in which it figures. (For what it’s worth, I think it is 
most charitable to interpret Kant and Frege as making claims about the 
descriptive content of these judgments.) This raises the question: if ‘ought’ 
considered as a modal doesn’t contribute to the descriptive content of the 
statements in which it figures, how does it affect their meaning? (Sections 3-4) 
Second (and much more tentatively), the expressivist tradition offers various 
unified explanations of why normative and evaluative statements are 
nondescriptive, but a modal-operator account of why ought-statements are not 
descriptions of reality does not extend naturally to evaluative statements. Words 
such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘better’, and ‘worse’ are not plausibly understood as modal 
operators in any usual sense. This puts pressure on a metaethics based on the 
modal-operator account of ought-statements to abandon the assumption that 
normative and evaluative statements are nondescriptive for basically the same 
reason, raising the question: what should metaethicists who follow me in thinking 
normative statements are nondescriptive because they are modal say about 
evaluative statements? (Section 5) 
 
2. Normative and Evaluative Statements as Nondescriptive; 
Some Historical Lessons 
 
When I say that some metaethicists, including myself, are impressed by the idea 
that describing reality differs from saying what anyone ought to do or evaluating 
                                                        
3 It is the view I defended in Chrisman 2012a and have developed in more detail in Chrisman 
2016a and 2016b. 
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things as better and worse, I think it is important to recognize that most of these 
metaethicists would recognize a prominent descriptive use of words such as 
‘ought’ and ‘good’. This was already hinted at by Ayer, who distinguished 
between the use of words to describe the moral sense of a particular community 
and their use as “normative ethical symbols.” In fact, on a careful rereading of 
Language, Truth and Logic, one can get the sense that Ayer regarded most uses 
of words such as ‘ought’ and ‘good’ as descriptive. On his view, many uses of 
these words are sociological descriptions of the morals of some group of people 
or descriptions of the verdicts of some normative system that conversational 
participants are assuming for the sake of conversation. It’s only when we get to 
the business of discussing what one really ought to do or what is really good that 
his verificationism about meaning led him to deny that the words carry 
descriptive content. 
We shouldn’t dwell on Ayer’s verificationist reasons for making this distinction, 
but I do think we should recognize a use of words such as ‘ought’ and ‘good’ 
where one is, in effect, describing the verdicts of some set of norms or values 
applied to some case. We should set aside these uses of ‘ought’ and ‘good’ in 
attempting to explain why normative and evaluative statements differ from 
straightforward descriptions of reality. 
With that distinction in place, Ayer famously argued that the use of “normative 
ethical symbols” is purely expressive, neither adding to nor subtracting from the 
descriptive content of the rest of the statement in which they figure (if it already 
had one). This has seemed implausible to many metaethicists.  How could a word 
be meaningful and yet have no effect on the descriptive content of statements in 
which it figures? But we have pretty clear examples of this in ordinary language. 
The word ‘fucking’ in “The fucking kids trashed the park,” is plausibly viewed as 
a purely expressive word.  It’s not a qualification of ‘kids’, used to pick out a 
specific group of kids; rather it’s a way for the speaker to express a negative 
attitude towards the kids who trashed the park.  This statement still carries the 
descriptive content that the kids trashed the park, it’s just made using a word that 
adds an extra expression of negative attitude towards the kids.  On a charitable 
interpretation of Ayer, this is like what “normative ethical symbols” do in most 
statements containing them. 
Even when charitably interpreted, this idea is not credible, for many well-known 
reasons. The logical properties of normative and evaluative statements seem to 
turn on their use of ‘ought’ and ‘better’ in a way that statements involving the 
expressive use of ‘fucking’ do not.4 Nevertheless, in moving beyond Ayer’s 
emotivism, we shouldn’t reject the idea that words can figure meaningfully in 
statements without contributing to the descriptive content of those statements; 
and a statement containing one of these words can still be descriptive, even if it 
also performs some other discourse role in conversational dynamics (because of 
the nondescriptive word in it). Ordinary uses of the sentence “The fucking kids 
trashed the park” are still plausibly regarded as describing something the kids did. 
                                                        
4 For different versions of this argument see Dreier 1996, Unwin 1999, Schroeder 2008, 
Blome-Tillman 2009. 
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Hare’s (1952) prescriptivism offers a radically different model for the role of 
normative and evaluative words. He thought they functioned somewhat 
analogously to markers for imperatival mood. A common account of the meaning 
of imperatives treats them as containing two elements: a descriptive content and a 
“make-true” operator on this content. The idea is that imperatives are 
linguistically suited to prescribe rather than describe because they involve a 
semantic operation on a piece of descriptive content turning it from something 
that can be put forward as true to something that can be put forward as to be made 
true. For example, “Kids, clean up the park!” might be said to carry the 
descriptive content that the kids clean up the park, but the imperative is not 
usable to describe reality in this way; rather it is usable to prescribe to the kids a 
complex action which would make this descriptive content true. This is why 
imperatives are often said to have satisfaction conditions rather than truth 
conditions. The situation is a bit more complicated for normative statements, 
according to Hare, but his core thought seems to have been to treat ‘ought’ in 
statements such as “The kids ought to clean up the park” as operations on 
embedded descriptive content that make it usable to prescribe action which would 
make the embedded content true. 
Even when charitably interpreted, this idea is also not credible as a thesis about 
normative and evaluative statements. Sentences deploying ‘ought’ and ‘good’ are 
linguistically embeddable in propositional contexts (e.g. under ‘believes’ and 
‘might’) that do not embed imperatives. However, we shouldn’t reject the thought 
that words can have their meanings in part because of how they function as 
operators on descriptive content rather than contributors to descriptive content. 
With Hare, we might want to say that such statements “carry” descriptive content 
but they do not describe reality as matching this content. I think this lesson is 
crucial for making sense of the idea that ought-statements are nondescriptive 
because they are modal. 
 
3. ‘Ought’ as Modal Operator 
 
Some metaethicists might think that ‘ought’ is a descriptive word, describing a 
relation between agents and actions. For example, an ordinary use of “You ought 
to call your mother” might be said to describe you as being obligated to perform 
the action of calling your mother. But, even if that looks halfway plausible in this 
case, it cannot be right as a general thesis about the word ‘ought’. There are many 
“flavors” of ‘ought’, not all of which have anything to do with agents and actions; 
and even for a more relaxed version of the relational view to work, the ought-
relation would have to be multifarious to the point of gerrymandering.  No agent 
is plausibly related to an action in “As they left an hour ago, they ought to be 
home by now.” And even if we think there are agents’ responsible, the relation 
that would be described by “There ought to be no childhood starvation” would 
have to be quite different from the relation putatively described by “You ought to 
call your mother.”  Moreover, we make general normative evaluations about how 
people feel, as in e.g. “One ought to feel sympathy for the bereaved” where it’s 
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very hard to see how this could be plausibly construed as describing a relation 
that is similar to any normative relation between an agent and an action. 
In response to these counterexamples to the relational view, some have suggested 
that ‘ought’ is ambiguous – maybe sometimes describing a relation between 
agents and actions, other times describing a relation between agents and their 
attitudes, and still other times describing outcomes as highly likely in light of 
some implicit body of evidence or some state of affairs as overall best.5 But the 
dominant view in semantics is that ‘ought’ – like other modal words – is not 
ambiguous but context sensitive More specifically, it is context sensitive in the 
way that many intensional operators are. These are usually treated as linguistic 
devices that shift the circumstances relative to which various pieces of embedded 
semantic content are to be semantically evaluated. Context provides input to the 
kind of shift that takes place. 
This is not the place to get into the general theory of intensional operators, but it 
might suffice to say that allowing that some bits of language are non-extensional 
is crucial for making progress towards the ideal of compositionality in our 
theoretical models the semantics of natural languages; and the existence of 
operators capable of shifting the circumstances under which some embedded 
piece of content is to be evaluated semantically as part of compositional 
processing of language is at the heart of all model theoretic semantic accounts 
that have any hope of achieving the ideal of compositionality.6 This is the 
semantic role of intensional operators, and modal words are commonly thought to 
be paradigm examples of intensional operators. 
In philosophy, this idea is perhaps most familiar from discussion of the epistemic 
possibility modal ‘might’. Consider a standard use of “Sally might be at home.” 
Assume, vagueness aside, it is the case either that Sally is at home or that Sally is 
not at home. In this case, it appears misguided to say that ‘might’ in this 
statement describes a relation Sally stands in to being at home. Rather, the 
standard view is that this word operates on the propositional content it embeds 
(that Sally is at home), evaluating this propositional content as true in at least one 
set of circumstances consistent with the relevant body of evidence. If we appeal 
to possible worlds to model various circumstances under which a propositional 
content can be evaluated, we could generate a simple 
MODAL RULE FOR ‘MIGHT’: [[might p]]
e = T iff p is true at some of the 
e-compatible worlds  
where e-compatible worlds are the worlds consistent with the relevant body of 
evidence.  There is considerable debate about how the relevant body of evidence 
for might-statements is negotiated, but the more general idea is clear enough. The 
word ‘might’ functions not to represent a relation but rather to shift semantic 
interpretation of the proposition it embeds, in effect directing interpreters to 
evaluate this proposition for truth not at the actual world but at all possible worlds 
compatible with some body of evidence. For instance, with typical uses of “Sally 
                                                        
5 See Humberstone 1971 and Schroeder 2011 for a view in this vein. See Chrisman 2012b for 
critical discussion. 
6 See Heim and Kratzer (1998: ch. 12) and von Fintel and Heim (2007). 
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might be at home” the modal rule for ‘might’ suggests one evaluate whether the 
proposition that Sally is at home is true at all circumstances compatible with 
some body of evidence. 
There are complexities in extending this intensional semantics to ‘ought’ that I 
don’t want to get into here.7 However, it’s enough for my purposes below to 
fixate on a simplified intensional operator view about ‘ought’ that treats it as a 
necessity modal rather than a possibility modal and allows a two-factored 
determination of the set of worlds relevant for modeling the circumstances at 
which its embedded content is to be evaluated.8  If we do so, we get something 
like this simple: 
MODAL RULE FOR ‘OUGHT’: [[ought p]]
fg = T iff p is true at all of the fg-
compatible worlds  
where f and g are contextually negotiated parameters determining, respectively, 
the background conditions and an identification of top ranked worlds relative 
some ranking of worlds, e.g. in terms of moral ideality, prudential betterness for 
some agent, probabilistic likelihood given some evidence, etc. 
For example, assume a use of “Peter ought to live in southern Spain” considered 
as a claim about achieving best quality of life.  If so, we could (as a first pass 
anyway) model semantic interpretation of this statement as follows: 
 p: Peter lives in Southern Spain 
f:  restrict to possible worlds where Peter lives in Europe, has a 
portable job, etc.  
g:  identify the remaining worlds that are prudentially best for Peter, 
where this is a resultant of lifestyle, food, opportunities for 
meaningful relationships, etc. 
Then the ought-statement is true iff the fg-compatible worlds are ones where p is 
true. 
The attraction of the modal rule for ‘ought’ is its unity, flexibility, and similarity 
to semantic rules proposed for other modal words. By treating ‘ought’ as a 
context sensitive weak necessity modal, we can predict fairly plausible truth 
conditions for all of the different flavors of ought-statements mentioned above 
without massive gerrymandering. The relatively simple rule doesn’t restrict 
application to agents and actions; and it can make sense of the different ways 
background conditions and ways of ranking things affect the semantic processing 
of various ought-statements in context.  Moreover, assimilating words like 
‘ought’, ‘should’, and ‘must’ to universal quantification over possibilia and words 
like ‘might’, ‘may’, ‘could’ to existential quantifications over possibilia allows 
                                                        
7 I address some of these in more detail in ch. 5 of Chrisman 2016a, where I argue that there is an 
agentive use of ‘ought’ embedding prescriptive content which is not propositional, and I explain a 
way to capture the relative weakness of ‘ought’ compared to ‘must’. 
8 This two factored account is the idea pioneered by Kratzer 1981. See Portner 2009: ch. 3 for 
general introduction and Chrisman 2015 for introduction to the case of deontic modals. 
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for an attractive explanation of what these words have in common qua modal 
auxiliaries. 
 
4. ‘Ought’ as a Modal and Descriptive Content  
 
Going forward, let’s assume the modal rule for ‘ought’ is roughly correct. How 
does that affect the issue of whether ought-statements are descriptions of reality? 
Here are two apparently competing answers: 
First: if the modal rule is roughly correct, ought-statements have truth conditions. 
So, like other statements with truth conditions, they can be believed true and they 
can be known. This means ought-statements describe a way reality could be. To 
be sure, since ‘ought’ is not a relational predicate, ought-statements shouldn’t be 
treated as ordinary descriptions of a relation. We need an alternative account of 
what they describe; we should develop an account of the pieces of reality the 
description of which grounds ‘ought’s semantic contribution to the sentences in 
which it figures. If we are realists about possible worlds and the relations 
amongst them, then we can say ought-statement describes a region of modal 
space: what’s true in all of some set of possible worlds.  If we’re skeptical of 
modal realism, we can still recognize various real relations of normative 
necessitation and view ought statements as describing these. 
Second: if the modal rule is roughly correct, ‘ought’ is a modal operator. Modal 
operators do not function to describe things in reality. This means that ‘ought’ 
does not add descriptive content to the statements in which it figures. But surely it 
has meaning. Ayer’s expressive and Hare’s prscriptive accounts provide two 
early and inadequate accounts of its meaning. However, Hare was closer to right: 
As an intensional operator, ‘ought’ is more like markers for imperative mood than 
the expressive use of ‘fucking’. It functions to shift the role of the descriptive 
content it embeds, meaning that ought-statements “carry” descriptive content but 
do not put this forward as a description of reality. The idea that ought-statements 
sometimes prescribe action rather than describe reality seems plausible as part of 
the story, but this is too narrow to work as a general account. We need a more 
general alternative account of what ought-statements do; we should develop an 
account of the conceptual role of ‘ought’ that grounds its semantic contribution to 
the statements in which it figures.  
Something like the first answer is fine for uses of ‘ought’ that Ayer would have 
regarded as describing the verdicts of some assumed system of norms. I think we 
should be skeptical of the reality of “regions of modal space”, but talk of what’s 
true in various possible worlds can be a useful way to model the content of 
statements describing real relations of necessitation, and verdicts following from 
some assumed system of norms might be viewed as a real relation of 
necessitation. Perhaps many or even most uses of ‘ought’ are like this. Certainly, 
in contexts where one could preface the use of ‘ought’ with phrases such as, 
“According to the values of capitalism…” or “On a Christian way of looking at 
this…” In these cases, it makes sense ask: “But what ought I really to do, think, 
 8 
or feel?” suggesting that there’s a difference between describing the verdicts of 
some system of values or norms and making a genuinely normative statement. 
Indeed, arguably, many uses of ‘ought’ are pro tanto, in the sense that one makes 
an ought statement intending to contribute to someone’s reasoning about what to 
do, think, or feel, but one still allows that the verdict could be undercut, 
overridden, or erased by other truths about what one ought to do, think, or feel. In 
these cases, the speaker might be viewed as describing what follows from (or is 
normatively necessitated) by some system of values or norms, without yet 
endorsing those verdicts as winning in the end. 
If we accept that descriptivist view for some uses of ‘ought’, why not accept it for 
all uses of ‘ought’? After all, descriptivism offers a simple account of why the 
modal rule for ‘ought’ generates the correct truth conditions (insofar as it does): 
those truth conditions articulate what ought-statements describe (e.g. what is 
necessitated and how it is necessitated). As already suggested, however, many 
feel a difference between describing the verdicts of some system of norms and 
making a genuinely normative statement. Moreover, if one is skeptical of posits 
of real relations of “all things considered” or “just plain” normative necessitation 
as part of the fabric of reality, we’ll want some view other than descriptivism for 
genuinely normative statements, on pain of viewing much normative discourse as 
being in error. 
How could we accept the modal rule for ‘ought’, which predicts truth conditions, 
and not view all ought-statements as descriptions of reality? To answer this 
question, it may be helpful to take a step back and consider what we’re doing 
when we develop semantics rules such as the modal rule for ‘ought’. These are 
meant to be parts of a semantic model capable of predicting semantic contents for 
whole sentences that are compositional in the sense that the content of the whole 
sentence is a function of the content of the parts and the way these parts are put 
together. This is viewed by philosophers of language and linguistic semanticists 
as crucial for explaining the learnability and productivity of language. However, 
that these models don’t tell us how to interpret them (e.g. they deploy terms such 
as ‘true’ and ‘refers’ but they don’t include a theory of truth or reference). For 
this reason, I would say that philosophy of language includes the project of 
explaining what it is in virtue of which statements and their parts have the 
semantic contents that the best compositional semantics says they have. Because 
it is not part of (compositional) semantics, I classify this project as 
“metasemantic.” It’s part of our overall theory of meaningfulness, though it’s 
probably going to appeal to elements of metaphysics, philosophy of mind, 
psycholinguistics, pragmatics, decision theory, cognitive ethology, evolutionary 
game theory, etc. 
Sometimes I suspect that the uncommitted end up accepting a descriptivist 
account of all ‘ought’ statements for lack of an alternative to the 
representationalist idea that truth conditions tell us how reality has to be in order 
for the statement to be true. What we need is an alternative metasemantic 
framework with the space to treat some uses of ‘ought’ as descriptive and others 
as nondescriptive. 
One way to make this space is to interpret a semantic model’s predictions of a 
statements’ truth conditions as telling us not how reality has to be for the 
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statement to be true but rather what thoughts a speaker has to have in order to be 
using this statement in accordance with the core communicative rules of the 
language.  For example, if someone says “Grass is green” most semantic models 
will predict that this statement is true iff grass is green – a prediction we might 
then interpret as an articulation of the thought one has to have in order to be using 
this statement in accordance with the core communicative rules of the language 
(e.g. sincerity rules and meaning rules).  
To get a version of nondescriptivism about genuinely normative ought-
statements, one needs to add that some thoughts are not representations of reality. 
For, of course, most philosophers want to say that the thought that grass is green 
is representational of the way reality is. However, representationalism needn’t be 
correct for all thoughts. For example, when it comes to the thought that Sally 
might be at home, the more natural view is that this though is not directly about 
reality but rather some sort of qualification of one’s epistemic position with 
respect to Sally’s location (which “in reality” is either in the house or not). 
A sophisticated expressivist way of combining these two ideas would be to argue 
that the thoughts a speaker has to have, in order to be using genuinely normative 
ought-statements in accordance with the core communicative rules of English, are 
nonrepresentational because these thoughts have a desire-like direction of fit, 
ultimately being more like conditional plans or universalized preferences than 
beliefs about how reality is.9 Insofar as we are impressed by the intuition that 
there is an important difference between describing how the world is and saying 
what someone ought to do, this sophisticated expressivist metasemantics for 
ought-statements provides a way to endorse the modal rule’s predictions about 
the truth conditions for ought-statements while denying that these statements are 
always descriptions of reality.10  
Unlike many other metaethicists, I’m not very moved by the idea that thoughts 
can be divided into the belief-like and desire-like, with attendant different 
“directions of fit” with reality and different roles in practical reasoning. It’s not 
                                                        
9 Chrisman 2016a: ch. 5, Chrisman 2016b. See Ridge 2014 for a sophisticated development of this 
approach within a “hybrid” expressivist framework that is capable of embracing the modal rule 
for ‘ought’ and treating some ought-statements as descriptive and others as nondescriptive. 
10 What about embedded uses of ‘ought’? On the one hand, this might be a question about the 
semantic content of complex statements, such as “If you ought to call your mother, then you 
ought to charge up your phone.” If so, the answer is relatively easy: the modal rule predicts truth 
conditions for complete ought-sentences like a general truth-conditional semantic model attempts 
to do for any declarative sentence. These predictions must then be integrated with the model’s 
treatment of sentential connectives, such as “if-then” to predict truth conditions for the whole 
complex sentence in which the simpler sentences figure. To be sure, it is a matter of considerable 
controversy in compositional semantics how “if-then” works, but as long as it takes truth-
conditional complements, the modal rule for ‘ought’ will be able to integrate with a rule for “if-
then” to produce truth conditions for the complex sentence.  On the other hand, however, the 
question about embedded uses of ‘ought’ could be a metasemantic question about what grounds 
our semantic model’s predictions of the truth conditions for complex “if-then” statements. This is 
a very difficult question, but one that is perhaps even more difficult for representationalists than 
nonrepresentationalists. It is sometimes claimed in compositional semantics that ordinary 
language conditionals are covert modals, in which case some of the same descriptivist and 
nondescriptivist ideas explored here about ‘ought’ might be explored in developing a 
metasemantic interpretation of “if-then”. But there are also other possible metasemantic accounts 
of “if-then”. 
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that I doubt the utility of the direction-of-fit metaphor, but I suspect many 
thoughts fall somewhere in between, having both or neither direction of fit, and I 
think the categories belief and desire are not usefully aligned to this distinction.  
Consider, for example, the epistemic ‘ought’. For reasons already alluded to, the 
usual use of “They left an hour ago, they ought to be there by now,” seems no 
more descriptive than an all-in normative use of “You ought to call your mother.”  
However, with epistemic modal statements, I think it is considerably strained to 
say that these statements don’t describe reality because they express thoughts 
with a desire-like direction of fit with reality. No, the reason they don’t describe 
reality seems to me to have much more to do with the way language can be used 
in conversation to position ourselves epistemically with respect to the truth of 
some proposition. Moreover, I suspect that many of the same reasons we might 
want to be nondescriptivists about ought-statements apply to other modal 
statements (might-statements, must-statements, etc.).  So I long for some more 
general explanation of why the thoughts expressed by genuinely normative 
ought-statements (the content of which the sophisticated expressivist takes to be 
articulated by predictions of the modal rule for ‘ought’) are not representations of 
the way reality is; and this explanation needs to be compatible with the idea that 
there are uses of ‘ought’ that are descriptive of assumed systems of values or 
norms. 
So that’s why I’m not inclined to go the expressivist route. What would a 
sophisticated form of prescriptivism about ‘ought’ look like in this context?  The 
original prescriptivist position was that normative ought-statements don’t 
describe reality but put forward some descriptive content as to be made true (for 
reasons that generalize). We might bring this in line with a different 
metasemantic interpretation of the predictions of the modal rule for ‘ought’ by 
claiming that the predictions a semantic model makes for truth conditions tell us 
not (i) what speakers have to think in order to use ought-statements in accordance 
with the core communicative rules of the language, but rather (ii) what speakers 
are committed to in virtue of using ought-statements to make assertions in 
ordinary discursive practice. Then, we could use this to turn the original 
prescriptivist position into a metasemantic interpretation of the modal rule for 
‘ought’ by suggesting that, while some statements are descriptive in committing 
speakers ontologically to a way reality is, other statements are prescriptive in 
committing speakers practically to acting and reacting in accordance with 
particular prescriptions and whatever they entail. 
On this sophisticated form of prescriptivism, the predictions of the modal rule for 
‘ought’ would be interpreted as articulations of the practical commitments carried 
by ought-statements in ordinary discursive practice. For example, the modal rule 
for ‘ought’ predicts that a normative use of “You ought to call your mother,” is 
true iff you call your mother in all possible worlds consistent background 
conditions including your practical situation which are ranked highest by moral 
ideals. Our sophisticated prescriptivist would not interpret the reference here to 
possible worlds and moral ideals representationally, rather she would interpret 
this prediction as telling us something like the following: someone who asserts 
this ought-statement in ordinary discursive practice is practically committed in a 
moral way to acting in accordance with the prescription call your mother! across 
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some range of circumstances (whatever circumstances are consistent with the 
background conditions including the practical situation of the “you” to whom he 
is speaking). If we want to include a reactive element to this, perhaps we could 
add that this includes the speaker being committed not only to calling his own 
mother if in relevantly similar circumstances but also to holding his audience 
responsible for not calling her mother in the circumstances in which she currently 
finds herself. 
So far, however, this looks like it has the same problems as the sophisticated 
expressivist view. It doesn’t work well for epistemic uses of ‘ought’, and it 
doesn’t extend well to other modals such as ‘might’ and ‘must’. Moreover, there 
are apparently normative uses of ‘ought’ that are not comfortably assimilated to 
the idea of prescribing action. What practical commitment is one undertaking, 
conceived as endorsing the legitimacy of particular prescriptions, when one says 
“There ought to be less childhood death and disease”? It’s not impossible to 
answer this question, but most answers strike me as a stretch. 
I think these problems can be overcome (but I’m not sure!) by modifying the 
alternative metasemantic view to be one about commitments to think and reason 
in particular ways rather than commitments to act in accordance with particular 
prescriptions.11 This idea generates an account of why the modal rule for ‘ought’ 
generates the correct truth conditions (insofar as it does), an account which is 
comparable in terms of simplicity to that provided by descriptivism: those 
conditions articulate what ought-statements commit a speaker to, how they have 
to think and reason in order to satisfy the implicit conceptual commitments 
affirmed by using ‘ought’ to make an assertion in normal discursive practice. 
To develop this, consider might-statements first. When a speaker makes a might-
statement, we can view her as implicitly affirming a commitment to think and 
reason in particular ways: roughly, to avoid thinking or reasoning in ways that 
would be inconsistent with the proposition embedded in the might-statement 
being true. Whether it is acceptable to commit in this way depends on what is 
ruled out by the body of evidence counting as “relevant” on the conversational 
score. Whatever exactly this is, we could conceive of an articulation of the truth 
conditions of a might statement (i.e. a prediction made in terms of existential 
quantifications over possible worlds consistent with a body of evidence) as an 
attempt to spell out which ways of thinking and reasoning the speaker has 
implicitly affirmed commitment to in making the might-statement. 
For example, when a speaker says “Sally might be at home,” he is committed to 
not thinking that Sally is at work and to not reasoning in ways that presuppose 
that Sally is not at home. This commitment is of course defeasible.  If he later 
gets really good evidence that Sally is at work, the speaker is certainly allowed to 
think that Sally is at work. It’s just that the commitment undertaken with the 
previous might-statement must then be abandoned (even if only implicitly). 
So, on this view, the commitment articulated by a statement of the truth 
conditions for a might-statement is not a practical commitment in the traditional 
                                                        
11 In Chrisman 2017, I explain how this might be incorporated into a conceptual role account of 
meaning for the sorts of expressions of interest to metaethicists. 
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sense of being a commitment to act (moving our bodies towards some end) in in 
accord with some prescription.  But it is also not an ontological commitment to 
reality being a particular way.  Rather it is a commitment to thinking and 
reasoning in some way. 
Could a similar view about ‘ought’ retain the virtues of the sophisticated 
expressivist and prescriptivist views while avoiding their problems? To do so, 
because ‘ought’ is more flexible than ‘might’ in the way it can take many flavors 
(moral, prudential, teleological, epistemic), we’d need to enrich our conception of 
the ways one can commit oneself to thinking and reasoning. What were 
previously conceived as practical commitments to act in accordance with some 
prescription could now be conceived as commitments to reason practically in 
certain ways, e.g. taking certain considerations to be decisive reasons for acting. 
This could help with genuinely normative statements such as “You ought to call 
your mother.” However, we could also allow for commitments to thinking and 
reasoning with preferences, e.g. taking certain considerations as reasons for 
preferring things (even if these never connect to someone’s ability to act). This 
could account for statements such as “There ought to be less childhood death and 
disease.” Similarly, we could allow for commitments to thinking and reasoning 
with credences, e.g. taking certain circumstances to be reasons for assigning a 
high credence to particular propositions. This might help with statements such as 
“They left an hour ago, they ought to be there by now.” 
Initially this might look like a disunified hodgepodge, but the general idea is 
unified: interpret the truth conditions predicted by the modal rule for ‘ought’ as 
articulations of the commitment implicitly affirmed by one who uses the 
statement to make an assertion in ordinary discursive practice, where this 
commitment is not conceived, in the first instance, as an ontological commitment 
to the way reality is but rather a commitment to think and reason in some way. 
Importantly, however, some commitments to think and reason in some way are 
ontological.  They’re commitments to think and reason as if reality is some 
particular way. So this metasemantic view is nonrepresentationalist in the sense 
that not all statements are treated as true just in case reality is some particular 
way, but it still allows that some (even many) statements are true just in case 
reality is some particular way. So if Ayer is right that some uses of ‘ought’ are 
best conceived as descriptions of the verdicts of the moral sense of some 
community or some assumed system of values or norms, then this account can 
make sense of these statements as descriptive. But it does so while preserving 
theoretical space to make sense of other ought-statements as nondescriptive. 
What this means is that it has promise of being the general account of that in 
virtue of which sentences have the meanings that our best compositional semantic 
account will predict them to have, while nonetheless avoiding commitment to 
global representationalism about truth-apt statements (something we already 
wanted to avoid because of might-statements).   
 
5. ‘Good’ as a Measurement of Value 
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At the beginning of this paper, I advertised my view about the meaning of 
normative statements as more inspired by Kant and Frege on modality than 
emotivists, prescriptivists, and expressivists on morality. I also suggested that this 
alternative route – via the idea that modal concepts are nonrepresentational – to a 
nondescriptivist view in metaethics doesn’t extend straightforwardly to evaluative 
statements. This is because evaluative terms are not modals, and it’s not natural to 
treat them as intensional operators. Relatedly, evaluative terms rarely embed 
whole propositions, such that it might make sense to explain their conceptual role 
in terms of some kind of formal modification of the propositions they embed 
rather than in terms of ordinary contribution to the propositional content of the 
statements in which they figure. 
Some philosophers will see this as a big lacuna in my metaethical view. If one’s 
metaethical nondescriptivism applies to normative words such as ‘ought’ but not 
to evaluative words such as ‘good’, then hasn’t one failed to defend a 
nondescriptivist view of the concepts targeted by metaethical inquiry? After all, 
Moore (1903: ch. 1) was originally focused on judgements about things being 
good, not about what someone ought to do, and this is what sparked the familiar 
debates between nonnaturalists, expressivists, error theorists, and naturalists. 
Why should we care about a nondescriptivist view about normative statements if 
that view cannot be extended to a similar view about evaluative statements? 
I understand the worry in these questions, but I don’t share it. I think it would still 
represent an interesting form of nondescriptivism in metaethics if normative 
statements were treated as nondescriptive, but evaluative statements were treated 
as descriptive. Such a view would respect the is-ought gap; it would continue to 
allow that ought-judgments play a distinctive role in practical deliberation; and it 
would arguably respect some of the intuitions behind open-question style 
arguments that originally moved Moore and Ayer. For these reasons, I am 
sometimes inclined to combine nondescriptivism about ‘ought’ with some sort of 
sophisticated relativism about ‘good’. However, I also think the above discussion 
makes space for a weak form of nondescriptivism about ‘good’, which I shall 
explore in this section. 
Semantically, statements about something’s being good seem to be very similar 
to statements about something’s being tall or cold. Words such as ‘tall’, ‘cold’, 
and ‘good’ are vague gradable adjectives with thresholds. A good start towards 
articulating the semantic rules governing them would include something like this: 
SCALAR RULES [[x is tall]]c = T iff tall(x) > thresholdc(tall) 
[[x is cold]]c = T iff cold(x) > thresholdc(cold) 
[[x is good]]c = T iff good(x) > thresholdc(good) 
Where the function tall, cold, and good take items and returns a measurement of 
how tall, cold, or good they are in some scale for measuring height, temperature, 
or value (e.g. feet, degrees Fahrenheit, or weighted preference satisfaction) and 
the function thresholdc takes measurement functions and returns a threshold 
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degree on the corresponding scale (e.g. how many feet, degrees F, or weighted 
preferences an item can have and still not be truly said to be tall, cold, or good).12  
As we know, scalar adjectives are generally context sensitive in the sense that 
how tall, cold, good, etc. something needs to be in order to be truly said to be, 
tall, cold, good, etc. will vary from conversational context to conversational 
context; and even within context vagueness can mean that there are borderline 
cases. Moreover, as Geach (1956) stressed, most if not all uses of these adjectives 
need implicit (if not explicit) determination of the category of thing being 
evaluated before we have any idea what is being said. So, before context can even 
shift the threshold, it needs to fix the category of items being evaluated as tall, 
cold, good, etc.13 
So it is obviously wrong to think that saying something is tall, cold, or good is to 
provide a context-independent description of reality. However, once context does 
its work, it is very natural to see ordinary uses of at least some of these adjectives 
as straightforwardly descriptive. After all, saying that LeBron James is tall in a 
context where we’re talking about all men or that Vancouver is cold in a context 
where we’re talking about North American cities in January would normally be 
regarded in metaethics as paradigmatic descriptive statements. These are 
precisely the kinds of statements with which expressivists contrast normative and 
evaluative statements.  
For this reason, representationalism would seem to provide the default 
interpretation of the scalar rules for ‘tall’ and ‘cold’. The representationalist view, 
recall, is that the rules above are correct (assuming they are) because they 
articulate how reality must be in order for the relevant statements to be true. It’s 
important to note, however, that the predicted truth conditions for statements 
about something’s being tall or cold include reference to a measurement scale and 
threshold. This is provided by context of utterance, and so part of what these 
statements describe – assuming that they are descriptive – is how something 
relates in its degree of height or temperature to the threshold on a contextually 
determined scale. 
Turning to the scalar rule for ‘good’, does the plausibility of the descriptivist 
view about ‘tall’ and ‘cold’ mean we should also embrace a form of metaethical 
descriptivism, according to which the scalar rule for ‘good’ is interpreted as 
articulating the evaluative way reality has to be in order for the relevant 
statements to be true? Maybe, but there does seem to me to be a difference 
between describing the verdicts of some way of measuring value and making a 
genuinely evaluative statement.14 One can make the former without endorsing the 
                                                        
12 Compare Kennedy 2007. 
13 See Thomson 2008 for a worked out version of this view addressing many of the shortfalls 
of Geach’s own suggestion but continuing in a similar spirit. 
14 Also ‘good’ unlike ‘tall’ and ‘cold’ seems to be multidimensional. I will largely ignore this 
here, but it provides another path to a nondescriptivim about ‘good’: perhaps some contexts 
do not determine how the various dimensions of value are to be weighed in determining 
whether something is good. In such cases, the function of good-statements might not be to 
describe something’s value but to set a standard for weighing competing values. See 
Plunkett and Sundell 2013 for further discussion of this metalinguistic use of vague and 
context-sensitive adjective and some of the implications it has for metaethics. 
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verdicts, whereas the latter seems to carry some conceptual connection to what 
there is reason to do, think, or feel. We can all recognize that, as a murder 
weapon, poison is good, without being forced to accept that there is any reason to 
use poison to murder or to admire those who do so. And someone who really 
thinks that saving for their retirement is good would seem to be irrational or 
unreasonable or deluded if they deny any preference or inclination to save for 
their retirement. 
Above, I argued that a broader nonrepresentationalism could make sense of 
descriptive and nondescriptive uses of ‘ought’. The idea was to interpret the truth 
conditions predicted by standard semantic rules articulating something other than 
the way reality has to be in order for the relevant statements to be true but also to 
allow that this “something other” could sometimes but not always carry 
ontological commitment. Even though I’m inclined to think that ‘good’ is used 
descriptively more than ‘ought’, this theoretical structure can clearly be extended 
to cover both descriptive and nondescriptive uses of ‘good’. 
One way to do this would be to use a sophisticated form of expressivism. That is, 
we might interpret the scalar rule for ‘good’ as telling us what thoughts someone 
has to have, in order to be using good-statements in accordance with the core 
communicative rules of English. But we go on to argue that, while some thoughts 
that something is good are thoughts about the way reality is, not all thoughts that 
something is good need to be like that. More precisely, for those uses of ‘good’ 
that look to be descriptions of the verdicts of a contextually supplied system of 
values (e.g. “As a murder weapon poison is good”), the sophisticated expressivist 
says that these thoughts are representational and the statements expressing them 
are ontologically committing. However, that leaves room for the expressivist to 
argue that other uses of good (e.g. “Saving for retirement is good”) express 
thoughts that are not representational. What makes them nonrepresentational? 
Maybe the expressivist can convince us that these thoughts play a distinctive 
functional role in our cognitive economies more like sophisticated preferences 
than representations of reality.15 
This sophisticated form of expressivism is attractive for the way it can accept the 
semantic similarity between ‘tall’, ‘cold’, and ‘good’, and for the way it can use 
the scalar rule for ‘good’ to treat some good-statements as descriptive and other 
as nondescriptive. However, it does commit the expressivist to developing a 
particular view about the nature of the thoughts expressed by genuinely 
evaluative statements. A nondescriptivism about ‘good’ more in line with the 
nondescriptivism about ‘ought’ outlined above can be less committal about the 
psychology of evaluative thinking (even if it has to be more commital about the 
normative structure of thinking and reasoning). If we think that genuinely 
evaluative uses of ‘good’ are the ones that carry some conceptual connection to 
what there is reason to do, think, or feel, then we could try to write that 
connection into the commitments we think are implicitly affirmed by someone 
making a good-statement. 
Recall, from above, that my preferred alternative to sophisticated expressivism is 
a metasemantic view that interprets the truth conditions predicted by our best 
                                                        
15 Compare Silk 2015 and Köhler 2017. 
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semantics as articulations of how someone making that statement in ordinary 
discursive practice is committed to thinking and reasoning. This applies to both 
descriptive and nondescriptive statements. For statements we think are 
descriptive, we add an account of how someone making the statement is 
committed to thinking and reasoning, where this includes thinking that reality is 
some particular way or reasoning as if there is something in reality corresponding 
to the statement.  For statements we think are not descriptive, we add an account 
of how someone making the statement is committed to thinking and reasoning, 
where this excludes thinking and reasoning about the way reality is. For ought-
statements, it was natural to focus on practical commitments, commitments to do 
certain things (though not all ought-statements are practical). For good-
statements, it may be more natural to focus on attitudinal commitments, 
commitments to feel particular ways. 
The resulting picture is one in which both evaluative and descriptive uses of 
‘good’ are assigned the same semantic rule (where the scalar rule for ‘good’ 
above is a first approximation). But we don’t interpret this rule as telling us what 
reality has to be like for the relevant statements to be true or what thoughts one 
who makes the statement has to have in order to conform to the core 
communicative rules of the language. Rather we interpret this rule as telling us 
how someone making that statement in ordinary discursive practice is committed 
to thinking and reasoning. When the good-statement is descriptive, they are 
committed to thinking and reasoning about reality in some particular way; when 
the good-statement is nondescriptive, they are committed to thinking and 




I began this paper by contrasting the route into a nondescriptivist view about 
‘ought’ offered by Frege and Kant on modality with the more familiar route in 
metaethics offered by emotivists, prescriptivists, and expressivists.  I suggested 
that the former is attractive for how it hews more closely to the standard 
intensional semantics for ‘ought’ and fits with broader metasemantic observations 
about the linguistic and conceptual role of other modal words such as ‘might’. I 
suggested, however, that a sophisticated expressivist could also provide a 
metasemantic interpretation of the modal rule for ‘ought’ capable of funding a 
kind of nondescriptivism about genuinely normative ought-statements. Moreover, 
both of these views could make sense of Ayer’s observation that some uses of 
words such as ‘ought’ are descriptive of the verdicts of particular systems of 
norms that are assumed for the purposes of some conversation, even if not 
endorsed by the speaker.  
So we might conclude that, if one wants a form of nondescriptivism about 
genuinely normative ought-statements, there are two available routes. The Kant-
Frege route may look unattractive for how it doesn’t extend straightforwardly to 
evaluative uses of words such as ‘good’. The traditional metaethical project was 
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to explain normative and evaluative thought and talk; so providing an account of 
one of these that doesn’t extend to the other is a lacuna in one’s overall 
metaethical view. And since the sophisticated expressivist story about normative 
thought and talk can be extended to evaluative thought and talk, we might think 
that’s a reason to prefer the Ayer-Hare route to a nondescriptivist view in 
metaethics. 
In the final section of this paper, I sought to deflect this objection. I don’t have a 
settled view about evaluative thought and talk.  But I think there are ways of 
developing a non-expressivist form of nondescriptivism so that it covers ‘good’ 
as much as it covers ‘ought’. So, in the end of the day, the deciding factor 
between these two ways of developing a nondescriptivist account of normative 
and evaluative thought and talk will be broader considerations having to do with 
what one thinks is foundational to a theory of meaningfulness and concept 
possession/use. Since I am skeptical of attempts to divide mental states into 
“belief-like” and “desire-like,” and more generally since language is a (mostly) 
public and observable phenomenon whereas mind is a (mostly) private and 
inferred phenomenon, I tend to like the non-expressivist route to a 
nondescriptivist account of normative and evaluative thought and talk. It is one 
which moves from the inferential/conceptual structure of language to the 
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